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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of the 2012 legalization of recreational marijuana
in Washington State on opioid abuse. Using synthetic control methodology, this paper
finds that the legislation prevented 638 overdose deaths and lead to over 3600 individuals
seeking treatment for opioid abuse disorders. Due to the large health, social, and
economic impacts of the opioid epidemic, further research should be conducted into ways
to reduce the number of opioid prescriptions, the number of opioid overdoses, and opioid
abuse generally.
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The Effects of Recreational Marijuana Legislation on the Opioid Epidemic in
Washington State
Steven Reid Dickerson Jr.

Introduction
The negative impacts of opioids in the United States cannot be overstated: in 2015
there were 33,091 overdose deaths caused by opioids, 12,989 of which were due to the
illicit opioid heroin. The heroin death rate increased 22.2% and total opioid related deaths
increased 15.5% from 2014 to 2015 (David et al., 2016). On average someone dies from
an opioid related overdose about every 15 minutes.
Opioids are a class of drug that includes prescription pain relievers (oxycodone,
hydrocodone, codeine), illegal pain relievers (heroin), and synthetic opioids (fentanyl).
Opioids treat chronic pain conditions but they also produce a feeling of euphoria. This
feeling causes many opioids to be highly addictive‒ even when taken as prescribed by a
physician (National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2017).
The sale of prescription opioid pain relievers quadrupled in the U.S. from 1999 to
2010 and opioid overdose death rates almost quadrupled over a similar period, from 1999
to 2008 (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011).
During this same time period, various states began to legalize medical, and
eventually, recreational marijuana. California was the first state to legalize medical
marijuana in 1996 and Washington quickly followed suit in 1998 (Eddy, 2010). In
November of 2012, Washington state legalized recreational marijuana use through ballot
Initiative 502, which took effect on December 1, 2012 (Subbaraman and Kerr, 2016).
4

Thes legalization of medical marijuana opened the door for physicians to
prescribe medical marijuana to treat chronic pain instead of opioids. Although medical
literature has not reached a consensus on the possible long term effects of marijuana,
there is growing consensus that marijuana can be effectively used to treat chronic and
neuropathic pain (Hill, 2015). Furthermore, physicians have begun to argue that
marijuana can be explicitly used to treat opioid use disorders (Hurd, 2017).
Previous literature has found a causal effect between states with medical
marijuana legalization and a decrease in the level of opioid overdose death rates
(Bachhuber et al., 2014; Cerdà et al., 2016; Shi, 2016). However, a recent study by
Jacobson et al. (2017) has found that these effects do not hold in states that do not have
dispensaries, which facilitate the retail sale of marijuana to qualified patients. This study
draws upon Pacula et al. (2015), who showed that states with dispensaries had higher
rates of medical marijuana usage, to conclude that “broader access to medical marijuana
facilitates substitution of marijuana for powerful and addictive opioids”. My study
focuses on the effects of the marijuana policy that allows the broadest access to
marijuana, the legalization of recreational marijuana, on opioid abuse.
However, I am not the first person to study this relationship. Barnett et al. (2017)
studied the impact of the legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado on opioid
overdose rates. They use an interrupted time series model with monthly overdose data
and find that the recreational marijuana legislation lead to a 6.5% decrease in opioid
related deaths. I expand upon this result by employing a different empirical strategy to
study the effects of recreational marijuana in Washington State instead of Colorado.
5

This paper provides succinct and relevant analysis on the effects of the
recreational legalization of medical marijuana in Washington State on opioid abuse,
treatment, and overdose deaths. This paper employs a synthetic control methodology with
two commonly used datasets, the Treatment Admissions Episode Data Set (TEDS-A),
and mortality overdose data provided by the National Vital Statistics System (NVSS) in
order to estimate the effect of the legislation. I also use summary statistics from the
National Survey on Drug use and Health (NSDUH) in order to help contextualize and
corroborate these results.
The legalization of recreational marijuana could lead to a decline in the rates of
opioid abuse and overdose by allowing individuals to shift away from using opioids to
using marijuana to treat chronic pain conditions, by allowing individuals to use marijuana
to lessen the negative effects of withdrawal symptoms, or by further destigmatizing the
prescription of medical marijuana in place of opioids. However, the legalization of
recreational marijuana could also lead to an increase in the rates of opioid abuse by
providing a legal gateway drug to opioids or by destigmatizing general drug usage.
My analysis finds that recreational marijuana legalization in Washington State
lead to a reduction in opioid overdoses but an increase in treatment admissions relative to
a synthetic control group. However, due to the nature of the synthetic control
methodology, causal inference remains intricate. I expand upon this in the empirical
strategy and analysis sections. Self-reported opioid usage declines over this time period
as well.
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This paper is divided into 6 additional sections. The literature summary surveys
the existing literature base. The data section presents the data sets. The empirical strategy
section discusses the analysis techniques. The analysis section studies the data. The
results section summarizes the findings. And the conclusion contextualizes the results and
offers a direction for future research.

Literature Summary
The literature summary is broken up into three sections. The first section analyzes
the opioid epidemic, the second section presents the history of marijuana laws in the
United States and Washington, and the third section examines the recent literature on
how marijuana laws affect opioid trends.
A History of the Opioid Epidemic
The opioid epidemic has many causes. The most direct are the aggressive,
misrepresentative, and criminal advertising of OxyContin by Purdue Pharma in the 1990s
and the changing beliefs about pain management in the United States (Lembke, 2012;
Zee, 2009).
Beginning in 1996, Purdue Pharma (owners of OxyContin), aggressively
marketed OxyContin, a sustained release oxycodone preparation (an opioid), to
physicians around the country and misrepresented the risk of addiction (Maxwell, 2011).
Purdue Pharma marketed OxyContin as having a risk of addiction at less than 1%, when
the true risk was much higher. This marketing campaign helped grow OxyContin sales
from $48 million in 1996 to nearly $1.1 billion in 2000 (Zee, 2009). In 2007, Purdue
Pharma plead guilty to “misbranding OxyContin, a prescription opioid pain medication,
7

with the intent to defraud or mislead… as less addictive, less subject to abuse and
diversion, and less likely to cause tolerance and withdrawal than other medications” and
paid monetary sanctions totaling $600 million (United States of America v. The Purdue
Frederick Company, Inc., Et Al., 2007).
This issue was greatly exacerbated in Florida, and a few other states including
Texas, by the existence of “pill mills”, profit-motivated rogue pain clinics that
misprescribed and over prescribed prescription opioids, and “doctor shopping”, where an
individual receives multiple prescriptions from different providers, in the 2000s (Chen et
al., 2013; Chakravarthy et al., 2012; Alexander et al., 2016). Through a series of
Prescription Drug Monitoring Program laws, pill mill laws, and raids carried out by the
Drug Enforcement Agency, many of these operations have been shut down and opioid
overdose rates have declined (Boyle et al., 2015; Herter et al., 2014). As of June 2012,
every state and Washington D.C. had a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program in order to
help physicians prescribe opioids more cautiously and responsibly, but further research
needs to be done to judge their effectiveness at reducing opioid abuse and overdoses
(Gugelmann et al, 2012).
Shifting opinions about how pain should be treated have also contributed to the
opioid epidemic. Recently, with the improvement of medicine, there has been a paradigm
shift from pain being a positive sign of vitality to pain being a symptom that doctors
should aim to totally eliminate (Lembke, 2012). While this is a shift that is hard to
quantify, it is important to consider when thinking about the incredible amount of
prescriptions for opioids.
8

There is also an economic component to the opioid epidemic: as the
unemployment rate increases by 1% then the opioid overdose emergency department visit
rate has been shown to increase by 3.6% (Hollingsworth, 2017). There were also a
myriad of other forces, incorrect prescribing practices, accessible legal and illegal
supplies, and lethargic government responses, that contributed to the opioid epidemic
(Maxwell, 2011).
The opioid epidemic wreaks havoc indiscriminately but there are more
pronounced effects in certain demographic groups. The most common individuals to die
from a drug overdose are white males between the ages of 25 and 54 (Hedegaard et al.,
2017). In 2015, 2 million Americans (12 and older) had a substance use disorder
involving prescription pain relievers and 591,000 had a substance use disorder involving
heroin (Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, 2016).
After 2010, the landscape of the opioid epidemic began to change significantly.
Heroin and fentanyl (a synthetic opioid) have been the major driving forces behind the
soaring overdose rates (David et al., 2016). The number of heroin-related deaths was
pretty constant from 2002-2010 but have increased in each subsequent year, possibly as a
response to a reformulated abuse-deterrent formulation of oxycodone, which lead to a
decrease in the abuse of oxycodone (Cicero et al., 2012, Dart, et al., 2015). The
percentage of deaths from drug overdoses involving heroin tripled from 2010 to 2015 and
the percentage of overdose deaths from synthetic opioids (such as fentanyl and tramadol)
also tripled over this same time period (a time when total drug overdoses were also
increasing) (Hedegaard et al., 2017).
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This epidemic has lead to a wide variety of responses at the state and national
level. In early 2016, Congress passed the 21st Century Cures Act which provided $1
Billion in new funding to combat the opioid epidemic‒ primarily through increasing
access to substance use disorder treatment (The White House, 2016), and in 2017, the
Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) awarded an additional $29 million to
44 states and the District of Columbia to help combat the opioid epidemic (Center For
Disease Control and Prevention, 2017). A majority of states have also implemented
naloxone access laws and good samaritan laws; both these pieces of legislation were
estimated to reduce opioid-related deaths by 9 to 11%, but the effects of good samaritan
laws were not statistically significant (Argys, 2017).
The opioid epidemic has had obscene impact in terms of loss of life, but it also
has impacted the economy as a whole. The opioid epidemic has been shown to have
strong negative effects on employment-to-population ratios and labor force participation
rates (Glenn et al., 2017). In 2013, the economic burden of prescription opioid overdose,
abuse, and dependence was estimated to be $78.6 billion (Florence, 2016), and this
number may have increased to $92 Billion in 2014 (Meisel et al., 2016).
The History of Marijuana Legislation in the United States
The first known usage of marijuana in the United States was in 1611 when
Jamestown settlers used it in hemp production. The usage of marijuana for medical
purposes soon followed. During the 1800s and early 1900s marijuana was widely
prescribed by physicians and pharmacists for a variety of illnesses (Chriqui et al., 2002).
Marijuana became illegal with the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 and its position was
10

solidified with the Controlled Substance Act of 1970 (Kamin 2014). As states began to
legalize marijuana, they created a paradox of legality where marijuana was illegal at the
federal level, but legal at the state level (Grabarsky 2013).
In contrast to the incredible economic cost of the opioid epidemic, medical and
recreational marijuana legislation generates huge revenues for States. In 2016
Washington State and local governments collected $65 million from recreational
marijuana sales (Washington State Department of Revenue, 2017) and in 2016, Colorado
State and local governments collected $193 million in taxes from recreational marijuana
sales (Colorado Department of Revenue, 2017).
Although the medical literature has not reached a consensus on the possible long
term effects of marijuana, there is unambiguous consensus that marijuana is less harmful
that prescription opioids and there is a growing consensus that marijuana can be
effectively used to treat pain and neuropathic pain (Hill, 2015). Furthermore, physicians
have begun to argue that marijuana can be explicitly used to treat opioid use disorders
(Hurd, 2017).
There are also some other effects of marijuana legalization that are worth
considering when making policy decisions. Medical marijuana laws might increase the
labor supply of older adults‒ which could be particularly important when considering the
toll the opioid epidemic is taking on the current labor supply (Maclean and Nicholas,
2016). In general medical marijuana laws have not had particularly negative effects (Hall
and Weier, 2015). However, medical marijuana legalization is associated with higher
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rates of health care visits‒ particularly related to edible marijuana products (Heard et al.,
2015).
The Effect of Marijuana Laws on Opioid Abuse
Medical marijuana laws have allowed physicians to substitute away from opioid
prescriptions and shift towards marijuana when treating a variety of medical issues
(Jacobson et al., 2017). Before 2010, medical marijuana laws had been shown to decrease
opioid overdoses and other opioid related harm (Bachhuber, et al., 2014, Cerdà et al.,
2016, Shi, 2016). However, a recent study concluded that only states with dispensaries,
which make it easier to obtain medicinal marijuana, experience reductions in opioid
overdoses (Jacobson et al., 2017).
This study by Jacobson et al. (2017) uses a difference-in-differences strategy that
compares opioid abuse indicators in medical marijuana states versus states where medical
marijuana is illegal. They use an event study analysis to estimate the effects after
legalizing medical marijuana to assess the causal impact of the legislation. They find that
when a state legalizes dispensaries as part of their medical marijuana legislation this leads
to a decrease in opioid overdoses and a decrease in treatment admissions for opioid
abuse. Jacobson et al. (2017) use treatment admissions as a proxy for opioid abuse
instead of analyzing them on their own. I interpret treatment admissions differently and
will discuss this in the results section.
A recent study by Barnett et al. (2017) use an interrupted time series model with
monthly overdose data and find that the 2012 recreational marijuana legalization in
Colorado lead to a 6.5% in opioid related deaths. However, they do not present a
12

compelling argument about the causal impact of the recreational marijuana legislation
because they lack a reasonable counter-factual for comparison.
They try to get around this issue by including two states, Nevada and Utah, as
covariates in their regression analysis. But neither state has similar pre-treatment trends,
so they do not serve as accurate control groups. Nevada follows a different trend
particularly over the 2007-2012 period and Utah follows a similar trend but has an
approximately 60% larger increase in their opioid overdose fatalities over the 2001-2012
period.
Because this study fails to effectively control for larger regional or national trends
in the opioid epidemic, their causal interpretation is tenuous. However, this study does
control for Colorado’s Prescription Drug Monitoring Program which passed the same
year as Washington’s Prescription Monitoring Program (Washington State Department of
Health, 2017). Barnett et al. (2017) found that their results held when Colorado made
their Prescription Drug Monitoring Program mandatory.

Data
This paper examines data by state and year on overdose deaths, self-reported data
on opioid usage, and data for the number of admission to treatment facilities for opioid
abuse.
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Opioid Overdose Crude Death Rate
The data on overdose deaths is provided through Center for Disease Control’s
(CDC) Wide-ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research (WONDER) system.1 The
WONDER multiple cause of death system provides data on overdose deaths from
1999-2015 by state and year. WONDER uses mortality data provided to the National
Center for Health Statistics by the Vital Statistics Cooperative Program which uses
information from all death certificates filed in the fifty states and the District of Columbia
to generate detailed mortality information. These mortality records include coded
information about cause of death.
In line with Jacobson et al. (2017), I have chosen to use the International
Classification of Disease 10th revision (ICD-10) codes. I tallied every death record by
year and by state that included one of the external cause of death and mortality codes,
X40-X44, X60-64, X85, and Y10-Y14 and the drug identification codes T40.1-T40.4.
These codes correspond to all types of death (unintentional, suicide, assault, or deaths of
unclear intent) related to prescription, illicit, or synthetic opioids. From this database, I
have also chosen to look at the opioid overdose crude death rate (per 100,000
individuals), as opposed to total number of deaths, in order to adjust for changing
population sizes.

 Further information on WONDER is available at,
https://wonder.cdc.gov/wonder/help/main.html#.
1
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Self-Reported Opioid Usage
The data on self-reported drug usage is provided through the National Survey on
Drug Usage and Health (NSDUH) which is administered SAMHSA. The NSDUH which
is an annual nationwide survey involving interviews with approximately 70,000
individuals aged 12 and older. This survey is conducted by a Research Triangle Institute
(a nonprofit that provides research services) professional who visits each of the selected
households and administers the NSDUH, which covers a wide variety of drug usage and
mental health topics.2 The state estimates in the publicly released survey results are based
on a survey-weighted hierarchical Bayes estimation approach and they are generated by
Markov Chain Monte Carlo techniques.
This study uses responses by state and year to a prompt about whether an
individual uses or has used (in the last year) a pain reliever in any way that was not
instructed by a doctor. Unfortunately, the NSDUH is only publicly available by state and
year starting in 2009 and the SAMHSA stopped asking about pain reliever misuse in
2014, so responses to this question are only available from 2009 to 2014.
Treatment Admissions
The data for the number of admissions to treatment facilities by state and year for
opioid abuse is provided through the Treatment Episode Data Set (TEDS-A)
administered by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration
(SAMHSA). The TEDS-A data set only includes admissions to treatment facilities across

 Further information on the NSDUH available at,
https://nsduhweb.rti.org/respweb/project_description.html.
2
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the country and is accessible through the years 1999-2014. The only facilities that are
captured in the TEDS-A data set are those that receive state alcohol and/or drug agency
funds. Furthermore, there are many legal differences across states which affect reporting
to TEDS-A.3 However, a previous study has found that the TEDS-A data set captures a
large portion of all admissions (Jacobson et al., 2017).
From the TEDS-A data set, I include all admissions to treatment facilities for
methadone addiction (an opioid commonly used in addictions treatment facilities), heroin
addiction, or a third generic opioid addiction category in my analysis of the overall opioid
abuse treatment admission rates.

Empirical Strategy
In order to address the causal impact of the recreational marijuana legislation, it is
important to have a reasonable counterfactual. Unfortunately, the perfect counterfactual
for comparison is a hypothetical Washington where the recreational marijuana legislation
failed to pass. This study constructs a synthetic control group to use as the counterfactual
to estimate what would have happened in Washington in the absence of the legislation.
For the synthetic control group, Synthetic Washington, this study uses the
methodology laid out by Galiani and Quistorff (2016) which builds upon work done by
Abadie

et

al.

(2010).

The

synthetic

control

method

is

similar

to

the

difference-in-differences method but instead of giving equal weighting to each untreated
group, a new control group is generated that it is a weighted average of the untreated

 Further information on TEDS-A is available at,
https://wwwdasis.samhsa.gov/webt/information.htm.
3
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groups which is designed to closely resemble the treatment group (Washington) in the
pre-treatment period (2012 and earlier) (Galiani and Quistorff, 2016).
The synthetic control is constructed to very closely resemble Washington State up
until the year the recreational marijuana legislation took effect. Technically this synthetic
control group is constructed in order to minimize root mean squared prediction error
between the synthetic control and the treatment group. To project the synthetic control
group into the post-treatment period (2013-present), the observed value (for overdoses or
treatment admissions) in each state is multiplied by its weight in the synthetic control
group (Galiani and Quistorff, 2016).
The critical identifying assumption in my analysis is that in the post-treatment
period the synthetic control group would have similar outcomes to Washington if the
recreational marijuana legislation didn’t pass. I will assess the specific validity of this
claim with regards to particular outcomes in my analysis section. But, generally, because
the synthetic control group has a similar trend to Washington in the pre-treatment period,
I assume that the synthetic control group has a similar trend to Washington, if the
recreational marijuana legislation was not passed, in the post-treatment period.
The validity of this assumption, that synthetic Washington is a good predictor of
Washington without the recreational marijuana legislation, is addressed by running
placebo tests. This means that a synthetic control group for each of the other 47 states
(excluding Oregon and Colorado) is generated based on the pre-treatment data and then
the synthetic control group for each state is compared to the observed values of the state
in the post-treatment period. However, none of these states had the same recreational
17

marijuana legislation, so the placebo test checks how well the synthetic control
methodology does at predicting outcomes in the other 47 states where no treatment
actually occurred. This assumption is measured by calculating a p-value which is the
fraction of states that have larger absolute deviations from their synthetic control group
than Washington has from its synthetic control group, Synthetic Washington (Galiani and
Quistorff, 2016).
However, this is not a perfect method because many states have implemented
policies aimed at reducing opioid abuse in the 2012-2015 period so that the observed
difference between the synthetic control group and the “treated” state is larger than it
actually would have been without any interventions. This would cause the observed
p-value to go up because many states are likely experiencing larger than expected
deviations from their predicted values. So it is likely that the p-values in this study are
overestimates of the true value.
Finally, due to the possible spillover effects between Washington State and
Oregon and the legalization of recreational marijuana in Colorado, this study excludes
Oregon and Colorado from the synthetic control groups. The spillover effect exist
because when marijuana became recreationally legal in Washington State, it became
easier to obtain for Oregon residents. So the effects of the legalization of recreational
marijuana in Washington would also have some effect in Oregon. Similarly with
Colorado, because Colorado legalized recreational marijuana the same year as
Washington State, it is probable that similar effects would exist in both states‒ so
Colorado would not make an appropriate counterfactual.
18

Analysis
This section is broken up into analysis about the opioid overdose crude death rate,
self-reported opioid usage, and treatment admissions related to opioid abuse.
Opioid Overdose Crude Death Rates
Washington’s opioid overdose crude death rate increased steadily from 1999 to
2008 and then saw a slight decline, leveling off in 2011. Between 2012 and 2014 there
was a decline and then in 2015 there was a sharp increase in the opioid overdose crude
death rate. Figure 1 shows Washington’s opioid overdose crude death rate (per 100,000)
from 1999-2015. Without any control group, it is impossible to tell what the effect of the
recreational marijuana legislation was on the opioid crude death rate.
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In the absence of this legislation, the opioid overdose crude death rate may have
increased or decreased significantly and that would be impossible to measure without a
control group. Washington had a high relative opioid overdose crude death rate from
1999 to the late 2000s but then in the 2010s many states’s opioid overdose crude death
rates began to surpass Washington’s. Figure 2 shows Washington and the other 47 state’s
opioid overdose crude death rates.

I created Synthetic Washington to serve as the control group to assess the impact
of the recreational marijuana legislation. Synthetic Washington is the weighted average
of the other 47 states (excluding Oregon and Colorado) that minimizes the root mean
squared prediction errors of Washington compared to Synthetic Washington over the
1999-2012 pre-treatment period. Louisiana, California, Nevada, Connecticut, and
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Maryland are the states with the largest weights in Synthetic Washington and many states
that have dissimilar trends have a weight of 0.
Figure 3 presents the trends of Washington and Synthetic Washington over the
1999-2015 period. Washington and Synthetic Washington follow similar pre-policy
trends but diverge after 2012. This divergence is pronounced. Synthetic Washington has a
much larger opioid overdose crude death rate than the rate observed rate in Washington.

The estimated effect of the recreational marijuana legislation is that it reduced the
opioid overdose crude death rate by 2.5961 people (per 100,000) in 2013, 3.089 people
(per 100,000) in 2014, and 3.3305 people (per 100,000) in 2014. That implies that this
legislation saved 181 lives in 2013, 218 lives in 2014, and 239 lives in 2015. Figure 4
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explicitly shows this difference between Washington and Synthetic Washington’s opioid
overdose crude death rates.

Concluding a causal inference is intricate. The p-values for the three
post-legislation years are 0.13 in 2013, 0.19 in 2014, and 0.29 in 2015, which implies that
13% of states had a larger deviation from their synthetic control group in 2013, 19% in
2014, and 29% in 2015. Figure 5 illustrates each state's deviation from its synthetic
control group.
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For many of the states with large post-treatment deviations, their synthetic control
groups do not accurately match the state in the pre-treatment period. For many of these
outlier states, the root mean squared prediction error, a term that calculates the total
deviation in the pre-treatment period, are between 3 and 10 times larger than the root
mean squared prediction error for Synthetic Washington. For these states, the synthetic
control groups do not predict the pre-treatment trends well, so I do not expect that they
would predict the post-treatment trends well either.
In order to overcome this issue, I tried running the placebo tests again after
removing states with root mean squared prediction errors which were larger than a
multiple of Washington’s root mean squared prediction error. I tried removing states that
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had root mean squared prediction errors that were 1000%, 500%, 300%, 200% and 150%
larger than Washington’s root mean squared prediction errors from the placebo test. The
p-values were remarkably robust to this sort of deletion.
The only restriction that yielded a significant difference was the 150% restriction.
After limiting the placebo test to states that had less than 150% of Washington’s root
mean squared prediction error, there were 25 remaining comparison states and the
p-values were 0 for 2013, 0.08 for 2014, and 0.20 for 2015 which implies that none of the
25 states had larger deviations than Washington in 2013, 8% of the states that were
involved in the placebo test had larger deviations than Washington in 2014, and 20% of
these states had larger deviations in 2015.
Of the states that had reasonably accurate synthetic control groups (root mean
squared prediction errors less than 150% of Washington’s), Washington had the largest
deviation from their synthetic control group in the first year after the legalization of
recreational marijuana and one of the largest deviations in the 2nd and 3rd years after
passage. This shows that the decrease in Washington’s crude death rate was likely a
result of the legislation instead of random variation or prediction error.

24

Self-Reported Opioid Usage
Due to the data limitations and availability for self-reported opioid usage
discussed in the Data section, it is not possible to conduct analysis using synthetic control
groups, so this paper only provides basic rates which are presented in Figure 5.
For the years available, self-reported misuse of prescription painkillers declined in
Washington State. Whether this is due to the recreational marijuana legislation is hard to
tell because it is hard to establish the pre-treatment trends. Furthermore, this decline may
not represent a decline in opioid abuse because it might only be capturing a shift away
from prescription opioid abuse to illicit opioid abuse.
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Opioid Abuse Treatment Admissions
This section employs a synthetic control methodology to analyze the impact of the
recreational marijuana legislation on treatment admissions. Treatment admissions in
Washington steadily increased over the 2000-2010 period, with a dip in the mid 2000s.
This increase slowed over the 2010-2013 period and then, in 2014, the number of
treatment admissions grew by nearly 2000. Figure 7 shows this graphically below.

In a similar fashion to the opioid overdose crude death rate, the effect of the
recreational marijuana legislation on treatment admissions is impossible to measure
without a control group. In order to get around this issue, I constructed a synthetic control
group from the 47 other states. Of the 47 other states, shown in Figure 8, Washington’s
number of treatment admissions was higher than most states over the entire 2000-2014
26

period. There is also a large variance in the number of treatment admissions across
states‒ that is likely caused by differences in population size, amongst some other factors.

The synthetic control group, synthetic Washington, is different than the synthetic
control group used for the previous analysis. This control group has been generated in
order to match the pre-treatment trend for Washington State in regards to treatment
admissions for opioid abuse. Illinois, Mississippi, Michigan, Arkansas, Connecticut, and
Maine receive the largest weights in Synthetic Washington. Figure 9 presents a graph of
Washington and Synthetic Washington for 2000-2014. They are incredibly similar in the
pre-treatment period and then diverge in the post-treatment period.
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Relative to Synthetic Washington, Washington State in the post-treatment period
has a large increase in treatment admissions. Figure 10 shows Washington’s number of
treatment admission relative to Synthetic Washington. In 2013 there were 990 more
treatment admissions than in Synthetic Washington, and in 2014 there were 2,637 more
treatment admissions.
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The p-values for these two years are 0.28 in 2013 and 0.20 in 2014, which imply
that 28% of states had larger deviations from their synthetic control groups in 2013 and
20% of states had larger deviations from their synthetic control groups in 2014. This
appears to convey a relatively high-degree of uncertainty about the true predicting power
of the synthetic control group methodology with respect to the number of opioid abuse
related treatment admissions. However, as is shown in Figure 11, many of the states with
large deviations also have very large root mean squared prediction errors so they do not
have similar accuracy to Synthetic Washington, so therefore, they should not be
considered in the placebo test.
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The states with large root mean squared prediction errors have synthetic control
groups that are bad at matching the pre-treatment trends, so I do not expect these
synthetic control groups to do a good job predicting the outcomes in the post-treatment
period. So I would like to only include states in the placebo tests that have relatively
small (relative to Washington) root mean squared prediction errors because these are the
states that are likely to have more accurate post-treatment predictive power.
I tried restricting the placebo tests to states with 1000%, 500%, 300%, 200%, and
then 150% of the root mean squared prediction error that Washington and Synthetic
Washington have. When I made this criterion more restrictive, the p-values for
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Washington became smaller. The p-values dropped from 0.28 to 0.08 in 2013 and from
0.20 to 0.04 in 2014 as more states were exclude from the placebo tests.
There were 23 states left in the placebo test when the states, whose Synthetic
control groups had root mean squared prediction errors greater than 150% of Synthetic
Washington’s root mean squared prediction error, were removed. Of the states that had
reasonably accurate synthetic control groups, only 8% had larger deviations from their
synthetic control groups in 2013 and only 4% of these states had larger deviations from
their synthetic control group in 2014. This shows that the increase in the number of
opioid abuse related treatment admissions in Washington was likely a result of this
legislation instead of random variance or prediction error.

Results
At the end of this sections I have included a subsection, titled “Limitations and
Critiques”, where I provide responses to a couple possible critiques and explicitly discuss
the limitations of this analysis.
In terms of both opioid related overdoses as well as self-reported usage there has
been a decline. However, of these two indicators, this paper only shows that the
recreational marijuana legislation had a causal impact on opioid overdoses. There is
insufficient data to draw a reasonable conclusion about the causal impact about the
legislation’s effect on self-reported usage. However, due to the causal impact on the
opioid overdoses, it is likely that there was also a causal impact on the self-reported
usage. Further, it is reasonable to assume that if less individuals are overdosing on
opioids, then less individuals are also abusing opioids. This is congruous with the decline
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in both the opioid overdoses as well as the self-reported usage. This is a large and likely
unforeseen benefit from recreational marijuana legalization in Washington State.
Despite the decline in these two indicators, treatment admissions have a sharp
increase in the post-legalization period, particularly in 2014. Previous literature relied on
treatment admissions as a proxy for opioid usage. However, with the presence of
mortality statistics as well as limited data available from the NSDUH, this paper does not
interpret treatment admissions as an indicator of opioid usage. This paper interprets
treatment admissions as treatment admissions, which are a benefit to society.
This is because the number of treatment admissions is likely a function of many
variables, one of which is definitely the rate of drug usage‒ but this is not the only
variable that affects the number of treatment admissions. Treatment admissions continued
to increase in the mid/late 2000s even when the opioid overdose crude death rate
remained constant (or even decreased). So, it is clear that the opioid overdose crude death
rate is not the only factor which affects the number of treatment admissions. Social
stigma, quality of treatment, financial conditions (funding and insurance structures), and
a wide variety of more nuanced factors, all of which the legalization of recreational
marijuana could impact, also affect the number of treatment admissions.
It should be noted that recent studies have shown that cannabis can be used in the
treatment of opioid abuse disorders (Hurd, 2016). The passage of recreational marijuana
in Washington expanded treatment options available to treatment facilities, could have
helped to de-stigmatize medical marijuana usage at large, and could have helped opioid
abusers begin self-treating before going to enter a formal treatment facility.
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Regardless of the link, Ceteris paribus, an increase in treatment admissions would
have a positive influence on opioid abuse and overdoses. By this rationale, because
recreational marijuana legislation has not lead to an increase in opioid usage, the increase
in treatment admissions should be interpreted as a positive effect of this legislation.
Limitations and Critiques
One possible critique is that there are no control variables in this analysis. This
could lead to omitted variable bias. However, when testing different synthetic control
groups, using the male/female population ratio, median household-income, percent of
individuals who are white, and other demographic factors at the annual and state level,
there are only very small changes to the outcomes of Washington relative to Synthetic
Washington for opioid overdoses. The changes in the effects on treatment admissions are
larger, but not more than 1,600 treatment admissions.
Another possible critique is that Washington State passed a Prescription
Monitoring Program in 2007 that took effect in 2011 (Washington State Department of
Health, 2017), so some of the decrease in opioid related overdoses or increase in
treatment admissions observed in the 2013-2015 period could be due to this legislation.
However, this is unlikely because previous literature has shown that similar Prescription
Drug Monitoring Programs have had little to no effect on drug overdoses (Desai 2011),
since 2010 the main drivers of the opioid epidemic have been the synthetic opioid
fentanyl and the illicit opioid heroin (David et al., 2016), and, because this legislation was
passed in 2007 and took effect in 2011, there were many years for doctors to adjust their
prescription habits to comply with the legislation before the implementation date.
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Furthermore there were two years where this legislation could have impacted overdose
rates and the number of treatment admissions before the recreational marijuana
legislation took effect.
One limitation is that part of the decrease in opioid overdoses is likely partly
explainable by the increase in treatment admissions. However, treatment admissions have
been steadily increasing over the entire 2000-2014 period, but there have been no large
declines in opioid abuse overdoses over the same period. Furthermore, even if the
increase in treatment admissions explained the decline in opioid overdoses, there is no
other factor that would likely have lead to an increase in treatment admissions for opioid
abuse. Hence, this legislation would still have a large positive impact.
A third limitation is the amount of data; due to the recent nature of this epidemic
and legislation there limited data available. This study cannot analyze the long term
impacts of the recreational marijuana legislation and it remains challenging to create a
control group due to the limited pre-treatment data.

Conclusion
Previous literature showed a link between medical marijuana and a reduction in
opioid abuse, predicate on medicinal marijuana being available through dispensaries.
These studies use the opioid overdose crude death rate as well as the number of treatment
admissions as proxies for the total amount of opioid abuse. Additionally, Barnett et al.
(2017) employed an interrupted time series model to show that Colorado’s legalization of
recreational marijuana in 2012 lead to a decrease in the opioid overdose crude death rate.

34

I expand upon this literature by using a synthetic control group methodology in
Washington State to study the impact of their 2012 legalization of recreational marijuana
on opioid overdoses and treatment admissions in Washington State. In terms of the opioid
overdose crude death rate, my result corroborate Barnett et al. (2017) and show that the
legalization of recreational marijuana lead to a decline in the opioid overdose crude death
rate in Washington State.
But, in terms of the treatment admissions, my results contradict previous findings.
Previous literature has shown that medical marijuana laws lead to a reduction in
treatment admissions but my study finds that the legalization of recreational marijuana
lead to an increase in the number of treatment admissions. Because the opioid overdose
crude death rate was declining over the post-treatment time period, I propose that
treatment admissions should be seen as a benefit, instead of as a proxy for opioid abuse.
Further research should be conducted in order to determine the linkage between the
number of treatment admissions and the opioid overdose crude death rate, the long-term
impacts of recreational marijuana legislation, and the impact of this policy across
different states and times.
The opioid epidemic is and has been one of the most pressing societal and policy
issues facing our nation. It is ruining lives, destroying families, and killing thousands
every year. Due to the incredible societal harm and death toll that the opioid epidemic is
causing, it is imperative to continue analysis of and find effective responses to every facet
of the opioid epidemic.
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